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CHAPTER 13 OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
By GLENN WARREN MERRICK*
INTRODUCTION
Wage earner plans were conceived in Birmingham, Alabama,
in the early years of the great depression by Special Referee Val-
entine Nesbitt, who created them out of "the whole cloth of for-
mer Section 74."' He perceived the need for a relief provision for
individual debtors comparable to that afforded corporations by
section 77B, the ancestor to Chapter X. Building on his frame-
work, Congress enacted Chapter XIHI as part of the Chandler Act
of 1938.1 The basic theory behind wage earner relief has been to
allow hard pressed debtors to avoid bankruptcy, judgment pro-
cess, and creditor harassment by applying disposable income in
excess of necessary living expenses to the payment of debts under
a plan of extension, composition, or a combination of the two.
4
Periodic payments are made to a trustee under the protection of
the bankruptcy court, and the trustee distributes the appropriate
shares to creditors until the plan has been fulfilled or abandoned.,
The growth in the utilization of Chapter XIII was slow and
geographically skewed until fairly recently.' However, the 1970s
* The author is a clerk for Judge Thomas Reavley of the United States Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit. He received his B.A. from University of Colorado in 1976 and a
J.D. from University of Texas in 1979.
1 Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a Comprehensive Revision of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 115-16 (1975).
1 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1086 (1976). In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the wage
earner relief chapter has been designated using arabic numeral 13. See Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2645 (1978) [The Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 is hereinafter cited in text and notes as the new act or the 1978 Act]. In the
text and notes following, the designation "Chapter XIII" refers to wage earner relief
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, while the designation "Chapter 13" is reserved
for the wage earner relief chapter of the 1978 Act.
Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
11 U.S.C. § 1006(7) (1976).
Id. § 1033(4).
For fiscal 1951, there were only 6924 plans filed in the United States and 84%
of these were filed in Alabama. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRrs, TABLES OF
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have seen more extensive and uniform utilization among the dis-
tricts of this form of debtor relief.' The recent rapid growth in
filings can be attributed to greater awareness of its availability
and benefits among attorneys and debtors.8
From the debtor's perspective, the advantages of Chapter
Xm over liquidation are legion. The debtor is allowed to keep his
BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, Table F2 (1952) [hereinafter cited as TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY
STATISTICS]. By 1969, almost 29,000 wage earner plans were being filed annually but vast
discrepancies in Chapter XIII use between districts still existed. TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY
STATISTICS, Table F2 (1971).
One of the early motivating factors in revising the Bankruptcy Act, the Brookings
Report, D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORMATION (1971),
reported this disproportionality and the report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States echoed the finding. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. Doc. No. 137], The Commission suggested that lack of aware-
ness on the part of debtors and lawyers as to the existence of wage earner relief, differing
creditor and community attitudes toward insolvency, and reluctance from the bar and
bankruptcy judges in certain geographical areas all combined to produce the variation
in use. Id. at 12, 157. Other causative factors which have been mentioned include the
relative stringency of the state's wage garnishment laws, Proposed Bankruptcy Reform
Act: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 167 (1975) (statement
of Prof. Frank Kennedy) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings], the liberality of the
state's exemptions, id. at 192, the practicality of wage earner plans in areas where the cost
of living consumes most of disposable earnings, id. at 1346 (statement of Paul Winkler),
and differences of opinion about the purpose of Chapter XIII as primarily a tool for debtor
relief or as a collection device for creditors. Cyr, supra note 1, at 117.
Some bankruptcy judges have been unenthusiastic about Chapter XIII because they
lack familiarity with it. A few devote most of their time to complex corporate reorganiza-
tions while others are only part-time judges. Id. at 116-17. Attorneys may be reluctant to
take on a Chapter XIII case because they fear it will prove uneconomical, requiring
numerous, sporadic court appearances. In addition, an attorney's volume of Chapter XIII
cases may not justify the expense. 1975 House Hearings, supra at 1325 (statement of U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr); id. at 1346 (statement of Paul Winkler). But cf. Meth,
Making Wage Earner Proceedings More Effective, 80 COM. L.J. 14, 14-15 (1975) (attorneys
not usually required to render extensive service).
However, one commentator pointed out that the Commission's criticism as to lack of
utilization and nonuniformity of use of Chapter XIII was based on findings by the Brook-
ings Institution which were ten to fifteen years old and inconsistent with current facts.
Proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 590 (1975) (statement of Claude L. Rice, Chairman of the Legislative
Committee for the National Association of Chapter XIII Trustees) [hereinafter cited as
1975 Senate Hearings].
TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 6 at Table F2 (1978).
s At least one commentator has criticized the Commission's view that most debtors
are unaware of wage earner relief. Presson, Let's Talk Some Common Sense About the
Administration of Consumer Bankruptcies, 49 AM. BANKR. LJ. 263, 283 (1975).
1 One advantage has been eliminated by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Under
current law, credit information concerning bankruptcies must be purged from credit re-
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property and build equity because liquidation is not the focus.
Bankruptcy is more likely to have an adverse effect on future
employment, job advancement, bondability, and social status.
Some lending organizations will not make purchase money home
loans to those who have been in liquidation while Chapter XIm
debtors have obtained FHA insured home loans during the
pendency of their plan. After bankruptcy, the bankrupt may be
forced to defend against exceptions to discharge but these are less
likely to be filed after wage earner cases since the debtor generally
will have proposed significant payment rather than avaricious
composition. Moreover, bankruptcy remains an alternative
should financial problems recur within six years of the petition
for extension relief.'0 In addition, Chapter XIII allows the debtor
to retain a sense of pride in attempting to meet his obligations
and avoid a perceived stigma of bankruptcy." Finally, the auto-
matic stay of suits against the debtor and actions to enforce liens
on his property are broader in Chapter XIII than in bankruptcy
because all creditors are stayed regardless of whether their claims
are dischargeable."
cords after a lapse of fourteen years. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1) (1976). Information regarding
wage earner relief can be kept only seven years. Id. § 1681s(a)(6). Section 312(b) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act amends the law to provide that information regarding either form
of relief can be kept for ten years. 1978 Act § 312(b) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §
1681c(a)(1)).
'0 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 20.01 (14th ed. 1940); 3 D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1121 (2d ed. 1978); Girth, The Bankruptcy Reform Process: Minimizing
Judicial Control in Wage Earners' Plans, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 51, 54 (1977); Goldstein,
A Solution to Consumer Bankruptcy: Chapter XIII, an Alternative, 76 COM. L.J. 261
(1971). Under the 1978 Act, liquidation will be a viable alternative within six years of a
composition petition in certain circumstances. 1978 Act, § 727(a)(9) (to be codified in 11
U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)). See note 263 and accompanying text infra.
" See authorities cited at note 10 supra. It is difficult to establish concretely whether
the slur of bankruptcy is actually more severe than the stigma of Chapter Xm. Intuitively,
it would seem that the credit community would be more receptive to those with wage
earner relief in their background. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 595]; 3 D. CowANS, supra note 10 at 423-24; Goldstein,
supra note 10. However, it may be that creditors in some locales are not sophisticated
enough to distinguish between the two. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 607
(statement of Sam Plowden, Past President of the Association of Chapter XIII Trustees).
Where competition between creditors is stiff, neither form of relief is particularly con-
demning. See id. at 608-09 (statement of Andrew Leoni). In other areas, both forms of
relief may be fatal to a credit rating. See generally S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1978) fhereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 989].
"z 10 COLLIER 6N BANKRUPTCY 23.05 (14th ed. 1940); Note, 4 MEM. ST. U. L. REv.
554 (1974). But cf Power-Pak Products, Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 684
(W.D.N.Y. 1974) (intimates a contrary result under BANKR. R. 11-44). The 1978 Act will
1979
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It has been suggested that consumer credit counseling organ-
izations, prevalent in some parts of the country, are viable alter-
natives for the debtor contemplating wage earner relief. These
organizations advertise themselves as non-profit entities which
counsel the debtor and attempt to work out arrangements be-
tween him and his creditors."3 However, these organizations can-
not guarantee a cessation of creditor garnishment and harass-
ment. Moreover, interest charges, late charges, and revolving
charges do not abate when the debtor seeks assistance from them.
Finally, Chapter XIII presents an opportunity to reject unprofit-
able executory contracts and unexpired leases, while these medi-
ators, funded by creditors, do not offer this alternative.'4 Thus,
while they advertise themselves as free, their actual cost can be
much higher than wage earner relief.
Chapter XHI's advantages to creditors are obvious. The cred-
itor who is not fully secured is likely to receive a greater percen-
tage of his claim under a wage earner plan than in liquidation,
and he may-retain the debtor as a future customer. 5 Wage earner
plans also provide a more equitable distribution for those credi-
tors whose claims would not be reaffirmed subsequent to bank-
ruptcy. 6
A wage earner's employer may find that the employee is less
accident prone after relief from financial pressure. The employer
will find that he no longer is required to respond to repeated
garnishment proceedings. Moreover, his community stature may
be enhanced to some extent by encouraging financial responsibil-
ity among his workers."7
I. THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
A growing dissatisfaction with the operation of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 stimulated studies and proposals for new legis-
lation in recent years. The Brookings Report 8 spurred Congress
stay virtually all actions in liquidation and Chapter 13 regardless of whether the debt is
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 1978 Act § 362 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 362).
11 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 176 (statement of Robert Norris, General
Counsel, National Consumer Finance Association).
", 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1401-02 (statement of Duncan Kester). Id.
at 1326 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
11 This takes on added importance under the 1978 Act because business debtors are
eligible for Chapter 13 relief. See notes 36-43 and accompanying text infra.
IS 3 D. COWANS, supra note 10, at 424; Girth, supra note 10.
1 3 D. COWANS, supra note 10, at 424.
D . STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 6.
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to form the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States to study current laws and draft new legislation." The Com-
mission's report was published in 1973 and its proposed revision
was introduced into the Ninety-Third Congress.20 However, bank-
ruptcy judges and others were displeased with the Commission's
bill because they felt that the new government agency it would
create to handle administrative matters arrogated judicial func-
tions. In addition, they disagreed with the bill's form of a new
bankruptcy court system.2 Consequently, the National Confer-
ence on Bankruptcy Judges drafted a counterproposal, which was
introduced into the Ninety-Fourth Congress. 22 After a series of
compromises, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19783 passed both
houses of the Ninety-Fifth Congress and was signed into law by
President Carter in November of 1978.24
11 Previously, the Consumer Bankruptcy Committee of the ABA's Corporation,
Banking and Business Law Section had drafted amendments to modernize Chapter XIII.
Twinem, A New Version of Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 25 Bus. LAw. 1741 (1970).
2 H.R. 10, 792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
2 See, e.g., Cyr. The Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Back to the Drafting Board, 48 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 45 (1974); Hertzberg & Weingarten, The Powers of the Administrator Under
the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 79 COM. L.J. 82 (1974); Lee, A Critical Comparison of the
Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill for the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1 (1975); Seidman, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973-A Critique, 79 CoM. L.J.
297 (1974).
2 H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). The Commission's chairman
criticized this bill for failing to delegate any administrative duties from the bankruptcy
judge to the Bankruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 19 (statement of Harold Marsh, Jr.).
" Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (to be codified principally in 11 U.S.C. §§
101-151326 and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). See 11 U.S.C.A. Sp. Pamph. (1979).
" The pertinent legislative history of the 1978 Act can be summarized as follows.
Senate Joint Resolution 88, seeking to create a Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States, was introduced into the first session of the Ninety-First Congress to replace
Senate Joint Resolution 100 which had not survived the Ninetieth Congress. As amended,
it was enacted in 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The Commission's final report
was sent to Congress in July of 1973, H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, and its proposed
bill was introduced into the Ninety-Third Congress. H.R. 10, 792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973). A modified version was introduced the following year, H.R. 16, 643, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Since neither bill was enacted into law by that Congress, it was
reintroduced in the following one, H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The
Judges' Bill was introduced in the same session. H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Seas.
(1975). Hearings were held and published on both bills in both houses. 1975 House Hear-
ings, supra note 6; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6. Since neither bill was enacted
before the end of the second session, a compromise bill was introduced into the Ninety-
Fifth Congress. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (1977). The sponsors of the bill introduced
two subsequent clean versions into this same session. H.R. 7330, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977) and H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The Judiciary Committee of th House
recommended passage of the final version. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11. Meanwhile,
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On October 1, 1973, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy became
effective." The enabling legislation provides that the rules, con-
fined to "the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and
the practice and procedure" under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
are not to "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.""
However, to the extent the rules remained within their domain,
they are to supersede the Bankruptcy Act.2 The new act amends
this enabling statute to provide that the rules will no longer con-
trol over conflicting statutes.5 To date, no new rules have been
drafted to complement the recently enacted legislation so the
current rules will remain in effect. However, Chief Justice Burger
has announced the formation of an Advisory Committee on Bank-
ruptcy Rules to draft new rules pursuant to the Supreme Court's
rulemaking power.
2'
II. STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN CHAPTER XIII
A. Availability of Relief
The availability of Chapter XIII relief has been greatly ex-
panded. Originally, plans under Chapter XIII were known as
wage earner plans because there was a dollar limitation on the
maximum annual income of an eligible debtor.3 The Chandler
Act had set this figure at $3600,' but it was raised to $5000 in
a similar bill had been introduced into the Senate, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977),
and hearings were held and printed on this bill, Proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hear-
ings on H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machi-
nery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited
as 1977 Senate Hearings], as was the Judiciary Committee's report which recommended
passage. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11. S. 2266 was incorporated into H.R. 8200 on the
floor of the Senate and H.R. 8200 passed the Senate as amended while consideration of
S. 2266 was discontinued. 124 CONG. REc. S14,745 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978). After a series
of amendments on the floors of both houses, time was running out on H.R. 8200 in the
Ninety-Fifth Congress. Consequently, in lieu of a joint conference report, the amended
bill was read to the House where it passed with a final amendment, 124 CONG. REC.
H11,047,117 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978), and this final version was read to the Senate where
it passed as amended. 124 CONG. Rzc. S17,403-434 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
2See BANKR. R. 1-600, 11 U.S.C. app. (1976).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976).
' Id. For an extensive treatment of the current Chapter XIII rules, see Countryman,
New Rules for Chapter XI, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129 (1972); Leffler, The New Bankruptcy
Rules: Chapter XIII-An Evolution of Modem Bankruptcy Philosophy, 4 MEM. ST. U. L.
REV. 449 (1974); Note, The Chapter XIII Wage Earner Petition Under the New Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy, 4 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 554 (1974).
" 1978 Act § 247 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2075).
n [1979 NEws AND COMMENT] BNKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) D-21 A121 (Feb. 1, 1979).
3 Meth, supra note 6, at 14.
3, Complete congruity never existed between the definition of a wage earner in Chap-
VOL. 56
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19502 and was eliminated altogether in 1959.3 Currently, any
individual "whose principal income is deprived from wages, sal-
ary or commissions" is eligible, 3 and court decisions under this
definition have construed it liberally.15 Nevertheless, the Com-
mission's report felt that this form of relief should be available
to any individual debtor who could reasonably be expected to
make payments out of an anticipated regular income."6 The major
disagreement arose over whether a self-employed individual has
a sufficiently regular income to permit resort to Chapter XIII.
The Commission was of the view that it was unrealistic to expect
self-employed persons to propose and faithfully execute a plan
contemplating recurrent, periodic payments.3 1 The National
Bankruptcy Conference 8 and the National Conference of Bank-
ruptcy Judges 9 were unwilling to make such a conclusive pre-
sumption, and were more concerned with providing relief for
small business debtors for whom the elaborate procedures of
Chapter XI were not feasible.' 0 This latter view prevailed in the
1978 Act, although relief is restricted to an individual (and his
spouse is they file a joint petition) with a "regular income" and
noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $100,000
and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than
$350,000. These ceilings will apply to both individual and joint
petitions." The monetary restrictions were deemed necessary to
prevent sole proprietors with large businesses from abusing credi-
tors by opting for the somewhat more protective provisions of
Chapter 13 over Chapter 11.2 However, one commentator de-
ter XIII and the definition applicable to the remainder of the Bankruptcy Act which sets
a ceiling of $1500 on annual income. 11 U.S.C. § 1(32) (1976).
Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-905, 64 Stat. 1134.
Act of May 13, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-24, 73 Stat. 24.
11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1976).
In re Hawks, 471 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1973); In re Reed, 368 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Va.
1968); In re Bradford, 268 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Ala. 1967); In re Shamma, 369 A.2d 191
(N.H. 1977).
' H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 165.
1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 23-24 (statement of Prof. Frank Kennedy,
Executive Director, Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States).
1 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1421 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman,
National Bankruptcy Conference).
S' Id. at 1316 (Statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
The ABA's proposed amendments to Chapter XIII also favored allowing self-
employed business debtors access to wage earner relief. Twinem, supra note 19, at 1742.
" 1978 Act § 109(e) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)).
,2 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 119. See notes 272-94 and accompanying text
infra.
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scribed this view as an "irrelevant and excessive response to un-
substantiated conjecture that a few debtors may attempt to use
Chapter 13 to their own advantage."' 3
B. Abstention
A second structural change provides the court with unreview-
able power to short-circuit any form of relief under the 1978 Act.
The abstention provision contained in Chapter 3 provides that,
after notice and a hearing," the court may dismiss a case or
suspend any proceedings at any time if the interests of creditors
and the debtor would be better served by such action. 5
C. The Stay
The automatic stay enjoining suits against the debtor and
actions to enforce liens against his property has also undergone
change. Prior to the arrival of the bankruptcy rules, the courts
found power to stay creditors' actions in sections 611 and 614.6
This latter provision permits the court, without notice, to stay or
enjoin all actions against the debtor until final decree.'7 In addi-
tion, upon notice and for cause shown, the court may stay or
enjoin any action to enforce any lien against the property of the
debtor until final decree. This power extends to suits by holders
of claims who cannot be provided for in wage earner plans, such
as claims secured by real property, 8 even if the mortgage was held
by the Veterans' Administration 9 or by the Federal National
Mortgage Association." Similarly, the stay power has been held
" 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 662 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr).
" Creditors should be alert to the fact that this phrase does not guarantee them a
hearing if they do not request it. 1978 Act § 102(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)).
5 Id. § 305 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 305).
4" 11 U.S.C. 44 1011, 1014 (1976). Prior to the Chandler Act, the courts found power
to stay creditors in railroad reorganization cases under § 77 even without express statutory
authorization. Continental Illinois National Bank v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry.,
294 U.S. 648 (1935). For a more comprehensive treatment, see Countryman, Treatment
of Secured Claims in Chapter Cases, 82 CoM. L.J. 349, 350 (1977).
"7 In re Arzaga, 204 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Cal. 1962) held FED. R. Civ. P. 65, which limits
the duration of ex parte restraining orders at 10 days, inapplicable to this section.
" In re Hawks, 471 F.2d 305, 306 (4th Cir. 1973); Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); In re Townsend, 348 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Mo. 1972);
In re Pizzolato, 281 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. Ark. 1967); In re Willett, 265 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.
Cal. 1967); In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
"In re Townsend, 348 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Mo. 1972).




to extend to claims secured by personal property which were not
provided for in the plan." However, a few courts have suggested
that the court cannot prevent a partially 2 or fully securedu credi-
tor from reclaiming his collateral or pursuing other remedies.
The courts have generally required several conditions for the
continuation of the stay. Among these are: (1) the plan is pro-
posed in good faith and is feasible; (2) the stay is necessary to
preserve the estate or execute the plan; and (3) the stay should
not impair the secured creditor's collateral.u Several courts have
added that the secured creditor cannot be forced to accept less
than the full periodic contract payments5 and that the stay
should be conditioned on the curing of defaults within a reasona-
bly short period."
When rule 13-401 became effective, it changed prior law by
automatically staying all creditor actions against the debtor or to
enforce liens against his property upon filing of a Chapter XIII
petition. It is no longer necessary for the debtor to request a stay.
7
The rule provides for relief from the stay for any creditor who
timely files his claim or who is secured by the debtor's real prop-
erty." This relief provision is somewhat confusing because it pro-
vides that the stay will not be terminated, annulled, modified, or
conditioned except upon "cause shown." 5' Simultaneously, the
rule requires a party seeking to continue the stay to "show he is
entitled thereto."0 This quagmire over the burden of proof can
11 In re Clevenger, 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960); In re Burke, [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder] BANK. L. REP. (CCH) 63,507 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
0 In re Worley, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANK. L. REP. (CCH) 64,283 (E.D.
Mich. 1970); aff'd sub noma. Worley v. Budget Credit, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64, 285 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972).
" In re Pappas, 216 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1962); In re Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329 (D.
Kan. 1962).
"+ In re Wail, 403 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975); In re Cassidy, 401 F. Supp. 757
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Garcia, 396 F. Supp. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
" In re Thompson, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64, 769 (5th
Cir. 1973); Cheetham v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d 234, 238 (1st Cir. 1968);
Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); In re Townsend,
348 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Mo. 1972); In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Ark. 1967);
In re Pizzolato, 268 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
" In re Cassidy, 401 F, Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Townsend, 348 F. Supp. 1284
(W.D. Mo. 1972); In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
61 The constitutionality of a similar stay in BANK. R. 11-44 was sustained in Fidelity
Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1976).





be resolved by charging the creditor with the burden of going
forward and presenting a prima facie case for relief. Thereafter,
the burden of persuasion shifts to the debtor to justify continuing
the stay.6" The rule also provides for annulment of the stay thirty
days after the first creditor's meeting for a creditor whose claim
is not listed by the debtor and who does not file a proof of claim."2
Ex parte relief is available for a case where irreparable injury will
occur before notice and a hearing can be had.
3
The automatic stay will be found in section 362 of the 1978
Act. Like its predecessor in the rule, it serves to give the debtor
a breathing spell from his creditors by stopping all collection
efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions." It also affords
creditor protection by preventing a scramble to obtain payment
in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors. 5
Subsection (a) defines the scope of the stay. It prevents the
commencement or continuation of any proceeding against the
debtor, 6 including the issuance or employment of process, 7
that was or could have been commenced before the filing
of the petition. It precludes enforcement of prior judgments
against the debtor or his property and any acts to obtain posses-
sion of his property. Conduct aimed at creating, perfecting, or
enforcing any lien against property of the estate, or similar action
against property of the debtor, 8 to the extent the underlying
6' Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 177, 226-27
(1978).
62 BANKS. R. 13-401(c).
6 BANKR. R. 13-401(e).
" H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 121, 340; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11, at
54-55.
0 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 340.
" This includes arbitration, license revocation or any other judicial or administrative
proceeding. However, the court should ordinarily lift the stay for proceedings before spe-
cialized and nongovernmental tribunals to allow these proceedings to come to a conclu-
sion. Thereafter, enforcement of the order or collection of assets would come under the
supervision of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 340-41.
11 This was included to prevent the issuance of a writ of execution by a judgment
creditor to obtain property that was property of the debtor before commencement of the
case but which was transferred, subject to the judgment lien, before filing. Since the
remainder of subsection (a) pertains only to property of the debtor or property of the
estate, it would not prevent pursuit of the transferred property by issuance of process.
However, the creditor is permitted to foreclose on the property. Id. at 341.
" This subsection is aimed at property that does not become property of the estate
such as exempt property and other property that is not included in the estate under 1978




claim arose before the filing of the petition, is enjoined. Creditor
harrassments in the form of any action to collect, assess, or re-
cover a claim that arose before filing of the petition are similarly
prohibited. Contrary to a result reached under the rule," post-
petition setoffs are not permitted. The final provision in this
subsection stays the commencement or continuation of any suit
concerning the debtor before the United States Tax Court.
Subsection (b) lists eight exceptions to the automatic stay.7
These include criminal actions against the debtor, the collection
of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not
property of the estate," and acts to perfect an interest in property
when perfection would be effective against the trustee under sec-
tion 546(b). Actions commenced or continued by a governmental
unit to enforce governmental or regulatory power72 and the en-
forcement of non-monetary judgments obtained by a governmen-
tal unit in enforcing its regulatory or police power are also ex-
cepted. Similarly, the setoff of any mutual debt that arises from
commodities futures contracts, forward commodity contracts,
leverage transactions, options, warrants, or rights to purchase or
sell contracts or securities, or options to purchase or sell commod-
ities or securities will be permitted. The seventh exemption, con-
cerning foreclosure actions by the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development on property consisting of five or more living
units, will not be of major significance in Chapter 13 due to the
dollar limitations. The final exception permits any governmental
unit to issue a notice of tax deficiency.
Subsection (c) provides that the stay of any act against prop-
erty of the estate continues until it is no longer a part of the
"g In re Williams. 422 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
10 The Justice Department wanted to include judicial foreclosure proceedings initi-
ated prior to the commencement of the case because mortgagees lose substantial sums
with any delay. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 2116.
11 The automatic stay is one means of protecting the debtor's discharge. Stay of these
collections does not further that goal because these obligations are not dischargeable, 1978
Act §§ 1328(a), 1328(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(a), 1328(c)), and does not
prejudice other creditors because collections are from property that is not a part of the
estate. Moreover, a stay could lead to hardship on the part of the protected spouse or
children. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 342-43.
72 This provision is intended to be construed narrowly to permit actions to protect the
public health and safety and not to apply to suits by a governmental entity to protect a
pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or the estate. 124 CONG. REc. S17,409 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
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estate.73 The stay of any other acts continues until the case is
closed, dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied.
Subsection (d) contains the relief provision in the new act.
It provides that a court shall grant relief, such as terminating,
annulling, modifying, or conditioning the stay, if certain condi-
tions are met. The movant may seek relief for any reason consti-
tuting "cause," including lack of adequate protection of his inter-
est in the debtor's property." The burden of proving that relief is
not warranted lies with the party opposing relief.75 Alternatively,
with respect to a stay of an act against property, the moving party
may allege and show the debtor has no equity in the property.
7
If this is successfully established, a party opposing relief can still
defeat it by proving that the property is essential to the debtor's
rehabilitation .77
Subsection (e) adds protection which is not currently avail-
able to creditors. The stay is automatically terminated as to a
creditor requesting relief from the stay of any act against property
of the estate thirty days after such request unless the court, after
notice and a hearing, orders the stay continued in effect. 8 For
more complex cases, the court may make a temporary ruling after
a preliminary hearing.
13 Property is no longer part of the estate when it is exempt, sold, or abandoned. The
stay does not terminate as to property of the debtor which leaves the estate and goes to
the debtor. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 343.
1, 1978 Act § 361 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 361) provides guidelines for adequate
protection. However, lack of adequate protection is not the sole basis for relief under this
section. A desire to allow proceedings before specialized and non-governmental tribunals
to proceed to conclusion may be another reason for granting the request. See note 66 supra.
Other bases might include pending cases lacking any connection with or interference with
the pending Chapter 13 case. Examples include divorce or child custody proceedings, or
probate proceedings where the debtor is named as executor or administrator. Generally,
proceedings in which the debtor is a fiduciary or involving postpetition activities of the
debtor need not be stayed because they bear no relation to the purpose of the stay, which
is protection of the debtor from his creditors. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 343-
44.
4 7 1978 Act § 362(g) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)).
76 Id. §§ 362(d), 362(g) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 362(g)). This is aimed
at the problem of real property mortgagees where the petition is filed on the eve of
foreclosure. It is not intended to apply if the business of the debtor is managing or leasing
real property, such as a hotel operation, even if the debtor has no equity, if the property
is essential to rehabilitation. 124 CONG. REc. S17,409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
17 1978 Act §§ 362(d), 362(g) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 362(g)). The
Department of Justice suggested that judicial and power of sale foreclosures should be
permitted solely upon a showing of a lack of equity in the property. 1975 House Hearings,
supra note 6, at 2116-17.
"' This section did not meet with universal acclaim. See, e.g., 1977 Senate Hearings,
supra note 24, at 815 (statement of L.E. Creel 111).
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At all hearings on relief from the stay, the only issues which
are relevant are the adequacy of protection, the debtor's equity
in the property, the necessity of the property to rehabilitation of
the debtor, or the existence of other bases for relief. Other issues,
such as counterclaims against the creditor, are not to be de-
cided.7" However, this should not preclude the party seeking con-
tinuance of the stay from presenting evidence as to the existence
of claims which the court may consider in exercising its discre-
tion.80
Subsection (f) provides for ex parte relief from the stay for a
creditor who will suffer irreparable damage before notice and a
hearing can be had.
D. Turnovers
An issue related to the stay of creditor actions has been re-
solved by the 1978 Act. Under current law, it has been argued
that a Chapter XIII court may have no power to order a turnover
of collateral which has been in the possession of the creditor for
more than four months"' prior to filing the petition when the
property is needed by the debtor to effectuate the plan.82 Section
542 of the 1978 Act provides that any entity which has possession,
custody, or control of property of the estate or exempt property
must deliver it to the trustee or account for it unless the value of
such property is inconsequential. Section 543 extends this duty
to a custodian of property of the debtor.8
E. Codebtor Stay
One of the most controversial changes is the stay of actions
against a codebtor.Y Under the current Chapter XIII, a creditor
cannot be enjoined from proceeding against one jointly liable with
the debtor.5 5 However, if the creditor accepts a plan calling for
11 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 344; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11, at 55.
See generally In re Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
go S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11, at 55.
" See 11 U.S.C. § 96a(1) (1976).
12 Countryman. Treatment of Secured Claims in Chapter Cases, 82 COM. L.J. 349,
351-52 (1977), makes this observation and then argues that such power can be implied
from 11 U.S.C. §§ 11(a)(15), 1011, 1014 (1976).
1 The term "custodian" is defined at 1978 Act § 101(10) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(10)).
I d. § 1301 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1301).
In re Shelor, 391 F. Supp. 384 (W.D. Va. 1975); Heckman v. National Bank of
Washington, 201 A.2d 688 (D.C. App. 1964).
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payment of the debt and actually accepts an initial payment, one
court has held that he will not be permitted to pursue the co-
maker during the pendency of the plan. 6 If the debtor fears re-
prisal against a codebtor, his plan may include a provision waiv-
ing the right to proceed against the codebtor as long as the debtor
is not in default under the plan. Such a clause would bind any
creditor who accepts the plan."
The Commission's report concluded that a moratorium on
collection from codebtors is necessary to prevent undue pressure
being brought to bear on the debtor indirectly through accommo-
dation parties. Often these endorsors are coworkers, relatives, or
friends who cosign at the request of the debtor.88 The prospect of
creditor action against these persons was also thought to unduly
encourage payments conforming to contract terms under the
plan, thus making it more difficult to fulfill.8 9 Moreover, cosignors
may be in similar financial straights and recourse against them
will increase petitions under the Act. 0 Finally, if creditors are
permitted to proceed against codebtors, this may undermine the
purposes of Chapter 13 by encouraging the debtor to file a liqui-
dation petition and to reaffirm the codebtor's claim subsequent
to discharge.' Nevertheless, while the codebtor stay enjoyed
strong support in the legislative history, 2 many admonished
against its advisability. Some urged that terms are often ex-
tended based on the added security of a codebtor and inclusion
of the section would tend to tighten credit. 3 In addition, the
" In re Tesmer, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 63,984 (W.D.
Mich. 1971). But see Heckman v. National Bank of Washington, 201 A.2d 688 (D.C. App.
1964) (creditor cannot be stayed unless he accepts a plan which releases his right to
proceed against a codebtor).
" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1046(7), 1057; Schraer v. G.A.C. Finance Corp., 408 F.2d 891 (6th
Cir. 1969); 3 D. COWANS, supra note 10, at 446-47.
" H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 166-67.
0 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 122.
" 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 661 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr).
Id.
" E.g., 1976 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1324 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy
Judge Conrad K. Cyr); id. at 1400 (statement of Duncan Kester on behalf of the National
Association of Chapter XIII Trustees); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 315-16
(statement of Richard Hesse, Consultant to the National Consumer Law Center); id. at
622 (statement of California State Bar: Committee on Relations of Debtor and Creditor).
"1 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 904 (statement of Lynn Twinem on behalf
of Beneficial Finance System). Contra, 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 661 (state-
ment of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr). Cf. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6,
at 1432 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman) (any reduction in credit would be beneficial
to reducing the number of avoidable bankruptcy cases).
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constitutionality of enjoining actions against one who has not
filed under the Bankruptcy Act has been challenged." Neverthe-
less, Professor Countryman believes that the provision will with-
stand scrutiny because it deals with debtor relief and with the
debtor's obligations to his creditors. He argues that if the creditor
is permitted to harass accommodation parties, the pressure these
people will bring to bear on the debtor may frustrate any chance
of rehabilitation.'9
Section 1301 is a compromise measure tailored to meet the
situations which present the greatest potential for abuse. 6 The
stay extends only to acts or suits to collect from an individual
codebtor on a consumer debt. 7 Moreover, it does not protect a
surety if that person is in the business of guaranteeing or securing
such debts. The stay endures until the case is closed, dismissed,
or converted to Chapter 11 or liquidation. The creditor retains
power to preserve his rights on negotiable instruments by present-
ing and giving notice of dishonor,8 but he cannot attempt to
collect from the codebtor while the stay is in effect." Relief from
the stay is afforded by subsection (c). After notice and a hearing,
to the extent that (1) the codebtor rather than the debtor received
11 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 130 (statement of Walter Vaughn on behalf
of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association); id. at 143
(statement of Alvin Weise, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Law
Forum of the National Consumer Finance Association); id. at 606 (statement of Claude
L. Rice, Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the National Association of Chapter
XIII Trustees). See In re Nine North Church Street, Inc., 82 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1936); 1 H.
REMINGTON, REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY § 11 (1908).
" 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1431-32. Professor Countryman feels that an
expansive reading of the Act is permissible by analogizing to the breadth of the reading
the current law was given in Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank v. Chicago, Rock Island
& Pacific Ry., 290 U.S. 648 (1935). Accord H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 123 (not
constitutionally infirm because any codebtor protection is only incidental to the effect
which protects the debtor).
The counterproposals to the codebtor stay ran the gamut from giving them more
protection in the form of procedures for obtaining a discharge in the proceedings, 1975
House Hearings, supra note 6, at 943-44 (statement of Ernest Sarason, Jr., attorney for
the National Consumer Law Center, Inc.), to permitting collection from the comaker if
the creditor could show that the coparty is financially able to pay from assets other than
current earnings or property reasonably needed to support his family. Id. at 1433 (state-
ment of Prof. Vern Countryman).
'1 "Consumer debt" is defined at 1978 Act § 101(7) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §
101(7)).
" U.C.C. § 3-501 to -511 (1972 version).
" 1978 Act § 1301(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1301(b)). See also 1975 House
Hearings, supra note 6, at 1413 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman).
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the consideration for the joint obligation;'"0 (2) the debtor's plan
omits the claim; or (3) the creditor's interest would be irreparably
harmed by the stay; 0' relief will be forthcoming.
F. Debtors' Powers
The new act provides that all debtors may use, sell, and lease
property of the estate, other than in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, 0 2 after notice and a hearing and subject to certain protec-
tions for affected creditors. 0 3 In addition, a debtor engaged in
business' 4 is authorized to continue operation of the business,
and may, subject to certain creditor protections,10 use, sell, and
lease property and obtain credit in the ordinary course of busi-
ness.'06 This is a complete reversal of current law which limits the
rights, privileges, and duties of a Chapter XIII debtor to those of
a bankrupt after adjudication.0 7
G. Trustees' Powers
Any surviving controversy over the extent of the powers of a
trustee in wage earner relief' 05 will be laid to rest by Chapter 13.
A narrow reading of the current statute has led some to conclude
that a Chapter XIII trustee is a mere collecting and disbursing
agent. 0 9 Nevertheless, the Chapter XIII rules" and the over-
'" In other words, the debtor is the codebtor. This section is designed to protect the
individual who does not ultimately bear the liability, regardless of any agreement to share
liabilities in a different manner than profits. 124 CONG. REc. S17,423 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978).
"' This would include cases where the codebtor is deteriorating financially because
of a loss of employment or where the codebtor plans to leave the jurisdiction and would
no longer be available to insure payment should the debtor default on the plan. H.R. REP.
No. 595, supra note 11, at 122.
' 1978 Act §§ 1303, 363(b), (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1303, 363(b)).
" Id. §§ 363(d)-(f) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. 3} 363(d)-(f)).
I "Debtor engaged in business" is defined at id. § 1304(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1304(a)).
" Id. § 363(c)-(f), 364(b)-(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(c)-(f), 364(b)-(d)).
,o Id. §§ 1304(b), 363, 364 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1304(b), 363, 364).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1036 (1976).
"0 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1331 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr); 3 D. COWANS, supra note 10, § 1134, at 450; Comment, The Chapter XIII
Trustee: "Trustee" or Disbursing Agent?, 21 ME. L. REV. 53 (1969). See also Cyr, Chapter
XIII and the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: A Time of Reckoning,
75 CoM. L.J. 385, 389-91 (1970).
1' 11 U.S.C. § 1033(4) (1976); Bare, Chapter XIII, Wage Earner Plan in PROCEEDINGS
OF SECOND SEMINAR FOR REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY 467-68 (1965). See also 1975 Senate
Hearings, supra note 6, at 34 (statement of Harold Marsh, Jr.).
"o See BANKR. R. 13-307(a), 13-605, 13-606, 13-607, 13-608.
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whelming weight of the case law"' have allowed much greater
power for the trustee. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 pro-
vides a laundry list in Chapter 13 of the powers and duties of the
trustee. These include: (1) being accountable for all property re-
ceived; (2) investigating the financial affairs of the debtor; (3)
examining proofs of claims and objecting to improper claims; (4)
opposing discharge of the debtor, if advisable; (5) furnishing in-
formation about the estate and its administration to a party in
interest who requests such information, unless the court orders
otherwise; and (6) making a final report and filing a final account
of the administration of the estate with the court." 2 He must
appear and be heard at any hearings concerning the value of
property subject to a lien, confirmation of the plan, and modifica-
tion of the plan after confirmation." ' The trustee will also offer
nonlegal"' advice and assist the debtor in the performance of the
plan."15 This last duty is a compromise in a stormy controversy
over the proper roles of the trustee, debtor's attorney, and the
Commission's proposed new government agency." 6 It permits the
" City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver, 230 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1956); In re
Truman, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1702, 1711-13 (D. Me. 1975); In re Cote, 313 F. Supp.
509 (D. Me. 1970); In re Sparks, 306 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ala. 1969); In re Maye, 180 F.
Supp. 43 (E.D. Va. 1959); In re Heger, 180 F. Supp. 147 (D. Minn. 1959). See also 10
COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY 25.10, 26.01[3] (14th ed. 1940).
112 1978 Act § 1302(b)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1)).
"' Id. § 1302(b)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(2)).
"I The trustee should advise debtors in advance that he cannot give legal advice and
any communication between them will not be privileged. See generally 1975 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 876 (statement of Prof. Marjorie Girth).
"' 1978 Act § 1302(b)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(3)).
. The Commission felt that counseling prior to the selection of a form of relief was
essential to alerting debtors to the availability of Chapter XIII. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra
note 6, at 158-59. Both the Commission and Judges' Bills provides for such counseling.
Under the former, a newly formed government agency would perform the counseling. H.R.
31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-203 (1975). The latter bill authorized the local
office of the Bankruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
or another entity under contract with them, to assist the debtor in the preparation of
documents. Thereafter, he was to have been referred to an attorney on a referral list for
counseling and the selection of a remedy. H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-
203 (1975).
Some felt the bureaucratic counseling from a government agency might prompt the
debtor to choose wage earner relief when it was inadvisable. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra
note 6, at 863 (statement of Prof. Samuel Donnelly); 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6,
at 866 (statement of Prof. Philip Shuchman). Others felt that attorneys on a referral list
could not afford to be completely independent in their advice. Id. at 1264 (statement of
George Ritner). See generally 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 619 (statement of
California State Bar: Committee on Relations of Debtor and Creditor).
Judge Cyr reported remarkable success keeping down legal fees by maintaining a list
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trustee to assist the debtor in the preparation of documents and
the formulation of the plan"' and to counsel the debtor through-
out the duration of the plan."8 Finally, if the debtor is engaged
in business, unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee will
investigate the debtor's financial condition, the health of his busi-
ness, the desirability of continuing the business, and other perti-
nent matters. Thereafter, he must submit a statement of the
investigation, including any irregularities in the affairs of the
debtor, to the court. He will transmit a copy or summary of the
statement to any entity that the court directs."'
In light of the dispute over the scope of the powers of a
Chapter XIII trustee, it would have been more advisable to ex-
plicitly make reference in Chapter 13 to the trustee's avoidance
powers. This is especially true since earlier bills provided that the
power of the wage earner trustee and the bankruptcy trustee were
to be coextensive.' 0 Moreover, some had argued that the avoid-
ance powers should be limited to situations where creditors would
benefit rather than extending to those occasions when only the
debtor would gain because the property was not to be distrib-
uted. '2 However, the enumeration of powers and duties of the
trustee in subsections 1302(b) and (c) is not inconsistent with the
of attorneys willing to accept a Chapter Xm debtor at set rates. He also reported dramatic
increases in the success of Chapter XIII plans through the use of varied forms of counsel-
ing. Cyr, supra note 1, at 153-54; 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 60-61. He felt
that further reductions in attorneys' fees were possible if preparation of documents accom-
panying filing was done by someone other than an attorney. 1975 House Hearings, supra
note 6, at 1326; see also id. at 27-28 (statement of H. Kent Presson, Assistant Chief,
Bankruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts), Contra, 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 618 (statement of California State Bar: Committee on
Relations of Debtor and Creditor).
"I It has been suggested that neither the debtor nor the debtor's attorney tends to
formulate a plan with any degree of sophistication. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at
1327-28 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
"I Judge Cyr has suggested that ongoing counseling by a functionary other than the
debtor's attorney is necessary because few attorneys are trained or interested in extralegal
problems such as credit, domestic, employment, and medical problems which befall a
family pending completion of a plan. Id. at 1320. For a survey of the types of Chapter XIII
counseling that have been used, see Lee, The Counseling of Debtors in Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 387 (1971).
1" 1978 Act §§ 1302(c), 1106(a)(3)-(4) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1302(c),
1106(a)(3)-(4)).
1w H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6-101 (1975); H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6-601 (1975).
"1 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 130 (statement of Walter Vaughn on behalf
of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association).
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avoidance powers contained in sections 544 through 549. In addi-
tion, Chapter 1 explicitly makes the powers enumerated in Chap-
ters 3 and 5 available to the Chapter 13 trustee.'2
The current system under which the trustee is appointed by
the bankruptcy court has given rise to claims of "cronyism."'
2 3
Consequently, the draftsmen of the 1978 Act, while rejecting pro-
posals to allow creditors to elect the trustee,"' provided that the
court is to select a trustee from a list prepared by the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts.'25 In those districts se-
lected for the experimental United States Trustee System,' 5 the
United States Trustee will serve as the trustee in the case unless
he has appointed a standing trustee and that individual has qual-
ified to serve. ' '
Chapter 13 retains the power of the court to appoint a stand-
ing trustee if the number of cases filed in the district so war-
rants.'2 8 This provision has met with general approval in its opera-
tion under current law.'"
H. Creditor Control
Several structural changes are noteworthy because certain
provisions do not appear in the 1978 Act. Foremost among these
is the deletion in Chapter 13 of the requirement of creditor con-
sent before a plan can be confirmed. Under current law, a plan
cannot be confirmed unless it is accepted by a majority, in num-
ber and amount, of unsecured claims "affected by"'30 the plan.
In addition, all secured creditors "dealt with" by the plan must
consent to it.'3 ' The new act eliminates the need for any accept-
ance from unsecured creditors and provides that the plan can be
confirmed over the opposition of the secured creditors "provided
"5 1978 Act § 103(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)).
"5 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 431 (statement of U.S. District Judge
Robert DeMascio); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 19-20 (statement of Harold
Marsh, Jr., Chairman, Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States).
-2 Cf. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1302(a) (1977); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1302(a) (1977) (proposal contained in the earlier version of the 1978 Act).
"5 1978 Act § 225(b) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 604(f)).
" These districts are listed at 1978 Act § 1501 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1501).
" 1978 Act § 151302(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 151302(a)).
1 Id. § 1302(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1302(d)); cf. BANKR. R. 13-205(a).
" See, e.g., Lavien, Water a Myth and Watch It Grow!, 79 CoM. L.J. 116, 117 (1974);
Presson, supra note 8, at 284.
" This term is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 1007 (1976).
3, 11 U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1976).
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for" by the plan if certain creditor protections are met. These
protections are either: (1) the plan provides that the secured cred-
itor will retain his lien and the value of property to be distributed
to the secured creditor as of the effective date of the plan is not
less than the allowed amount of his claim; or (2) the debtor sur-
renders the collateral to the secured creditor.'32 In this regard, the
new legislation carries forward the dichotomy of rule 13-307(d)
between fully and partially secured creditors, by providing that
a creditor is secured only to the extent of the value of his collat-
eral.' 33 This will remove all remaining doubt as to the validity of
the rule.' 3 Creditors secured by a security interest in exempt
property should be considered to hold secured claims under the
1978 Act, because, unlike the current bankruptcy act, the 1978
Act contains no definition of secured creditor.' 35 Consequently,
secured claims are not restricted to security interests in property
that is assignable in bankruptcy.'
3
It has been suggested that the lack of creditor control is a
fundamental shift in a wage earner policy. Creditors' groups have
argued that higher down payments and shorter repayment terms
are inescapable results which will dry up credit availability to
some consumers. ,37 Moreover, they have argued that beyond tang-
ible security interests in collateral, creditors possess an intangible
security interest, the leverage of being able to insist on full con-
tract payment of the property, regardless of its value. They argue
that the value to the debtor may have been exactly what the
creditor bargained for in extending credit.'1 The 1978 Act rejects
this argument as unwarranted on constitutional grounds and as
a matter of policy.' 31 The elimination of creditor control is also
112 1978 Act §§ 1325(a)(5)(B)-(C) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)-(C)).
"I Id. §§ 506(a). 1325(a)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1325(a)(5)).
,U Compare In re Moralez, 400 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D. Cal. 1975), appeal dismissed 553
F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1977), and In re Derryberry, 4 C.B.C. (Mathew Bender & Co.) 492
(N.D. Cal. 1974) with In re McKee, 416 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ark. 1976); In re Wall, 403 F.
Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975), and Countryman, Partially Secured Creditors Under Chapter
XIII, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269 (1976).
,3 11 U.S.C. § 1(28) (1976).
See In re Strickle, [1962-1966 Transfer Binder] BuiKR. L. REP. (CCH) 61,551
(E.D. Ky. 1965).
,3, E.g., 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 141 (statement of Alvin Weise, Jr.,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Bankruptcy of the Law Forum of the National Con-
sumer Finance Association).
's Id. at 142.
'' H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 124.
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expected to reduce the number of persons, eligible for Chapter 13,
who opt for liquidation because they believe their creditors will
not accept a feasible plan of extension or composition.'40
The shift of attention from creditors to the court increases
the court's role. The judge is now the sole protection for legiti-
mate creditor interests through a determination of whether the
plan is proposed in good faith and whether it is feasible.' 4 ' How-
ever, as a practical matter, creditor control under current law has
been exaggerated. Secured creditors have been curbed by devel-
oping case law, and unsecured creditors fail to exercise their
check on pragmatic grounds.
While the authorities are in complete agreement that a plan
which deals with a secured creditor cannot be confirmed without
his consent, considerable doubt exists about when a plan actually
deals with the creditor. One line of cases steadfastly holds that a
plan cannot be confirmed where the secured creditor does not
receive full contract payments.'42 However, at least one case has
held that where the creditor's total payments under the plan total
at least as much as he would receive under the terms of the
contract or upon immediate liquidation, as long as his collateral
is not impaired, the plan may be confirmed notwithstanding his
objection.'4 3 This result has met with favor among the commenta-
tors.' Moreover, a developing line of cases suggests that while
the plan may not be confirmed, the creditor can be removed from
the plan which can then be confirmed. The secured creditor can
be restrained from seizing his security if it is essential to the
success of any plan and payments to the creditor insure that his
collateral will not be impaired."15 Thus, the stay can be used in a
,I Id. at 123.
1978 Act §§ 1325(a)(3), 1325(a)(6) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(3),
1325(a)(6)).
"1 In re Worley, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64,283 (E.D.
Mich. 1970), aff'd sub. nor. Worley v. Budget Credit, Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64,285 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 907 (1972); Terry
v. Colonial Stores Employee's Credit Union, 411 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1969); In re Pappas,
216 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1962); In re Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kan. 1962); In re
O'Dell, 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kan. 1961).
'" In re Teegarden, 330 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Ky. 1971); see also In re Wilder, 225 F.
Supp. 67 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
'" D. COWANS, supra note 10, at 436-40; Comment, The Uncertain Status of Secured
Creditors Under Chapter XII1 of the Bankruptcy Act, 9 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 377, 387-89 (1975-1976); Note, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 165 (1972).
"I In re Garcia. 396 F. Supp. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1974); In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933
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number of circumstances to circumvent the leverage the secured
creditor has over confirmation.
In practice, unsecured creditors have not shown a great deal
of interest in voting on the plan. 4 ' Once the plan has been con-
firmed, one study indicates that creditors also fail to contest mod-
ifications or request dismissal or liquidation even after numerous
defaults under the plan.' 7 Apparently they realize that they have
nothing to gain by moving for dismissal or conversion.
Real property mortgagees should be counseled that a plan
under the 1978 Act will be able to modify the rights of any credi-
tor other than a creditor secured by a security interest in the
debtor's principal residence.'48 The Chandler Act does not cur-
rently permit a debtor to affect claims secured by real property
because, in the words of the House report, such claims are "not
essential to or a proper part of a plan of settlement."'4 9 The Com-
mission' 50 and Bankruptcy Judge Conrad Cyr' both strongly
urged that the new act expand the ability of the debtor to provide
for continued payment on these claims but, understandably,
mortgage lenders were not enthusiastic about the proposal. 5 The
new provision is a compromise designed to afford protection for
creditors while allowing the debtor greater flexibility. Moreover,
it is intended that a claim secured by the debtor's principal resi-
dence may be treated in the plan under section 1322(b)(5). 53
(E.D. Ark. 1967): In re Pizzolato, 268 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1967). See also In re Wall,
403 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975); H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 165-67.
146 Meth. supra note 6, at 14; H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 162.
, Girth. supra note 10, at 55-61.
1978 Act § 1322(b)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)).
' H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1937). Another explanation is that,
normally, payments under a wage earner plan will be so small as not to permit any
reduction in mortgage payments, or the claim is so well secured that, in case of difficulty,
the debtor is able to refinance the debt with a mortgage extending beyond the period for
a normal plan. In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459, 461 (N.D. Ala. 1962). See also 3 D. COWANS,
supra note 10, at 435.
110 H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 166. The Commission seemed to believe that
the availability of Chapter XII relief was the reason that claims secured by an interest in
real property could not be dealt with in Chapter XIfm. Id.
,5' 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1330-31; 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note
24, at 663.
"1 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 714 (statement of Edward Julik, Senior
Vice President. Real Estate Division, Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co.); id. at 963
(statement of Daniel Goldberg, General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
"1 124 CONG. REC. H11,106 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17,423 (daily




The second major exclusion from the 1978 Act is the omission
of the "Seattle Plan." This device, conceived in its namesake,
would have provided that creditors pay the costs and expenses of
a Chapter 13 proceeding, including filing fees, the debtor's attor-
ney's fees, and other administrative costs. Both the Commission's
Bill 54 and the Judges' Bill'55 had adopted the suggestion and it
had received the approval of the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws, the National Bankruptcy Conference,5
6 and Judge Cyr.15 7
Nevertheless, substantial doubt existed as to whether the Seattle
Plan produces a composition which would bar further composi-
tion or bankruptcy relief for six years.' Others objected because
it precluded the debtor from ever paying his creditors in full and
avoiding the stigma of a compromise plan.
Finally, some doubt persists regarding the assessment and
collection of taxes in the 1978 Act. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
provides that federal taxes found to be owing within one year of
filing of the petition which have not been assessed prior to confir-
mation and any tax which may become due and owing during the
pendency of the plan, may be assessed against that collected from
the debtor, notwithstanding any other provision in Chapter
XIII.10 This provision also controls over section 57(n)'6 ' of the act
which requires claims to be filed within six months of the first
meeting of creditors.' While it was pointed out that such power
in the taxing authority to proceed within or outside the plan is
potentially disruptive to an otherwise feasible plan, 6 3 a similar
provision was included in both the initial House'64 and Senate' 5
H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-102(10), -102(25) (1975).
H.R. 32 and S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 6-402, -701 (1975).
l 4 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1434 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman).
Id. at 1320-21. However, Judge Cyr favors a general revenue tax over both the
Seattle Plan and current practice for financing Chapter 13. Id.
" Id. at 1327 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr); id. at 1429
(statement of Claude L. Rice, National Association of Chapter XIII Trustees).
I E.g., 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 600 (statement of Claude L. Rice,
National Association of Chapter XIII Trustees).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1080 (1976).
161 Id. § 93(n).
"3 In re Gates. 256 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1966).
"3 1975 House Hearings. supra note 6, at 1317-18 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy
Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
"I H.R. 8200. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1331 (1977).
"3 S. 2266. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1331 (1977).
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versions of the bill introduced into the ninety-fifth Congress. This
special tax section was deleted before final passage so the tax
aspects of Chapter 13 are controlled by section 505. This provision
allows a governmental unit to assess any tax, notwithstanding the
stay of section 362, after a determination of tax liability by the
court. 6 The final reading and explanation of the bill to the
House, however, which took the place of a joint conference re-
port, ' 7 indicated that the tax could also be collected after court
determination.
68
III. MECHANICS OF CHAPTER 13
A. Commencing the Case
The Chapter 13 petition commences the case." 9 Unlike cur-
rent law, there is no requirement of an allegation of insolvency or
inability to pay debts as they mature.'70 The 1978 Act continues
the rule under current law' that no involuntary petitions are
permitted in Chapter 13172 on the rationale that to compel an
individual to labor under a plan without his consent would im-
pinge on the thirteenth amendment'7 3 and federal statutes.'74
Moreover, an unwilling debtor is unlikely to retain his job or
cooperate in repayment under the plan; failure would be a virtual
certainty.7 5 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that collabora-
tion between creditors and a bankruptcy judge can, in some
cases, virtually compel what amounts to an involuntary petition.
If creditors file for an involuntary bankruptcy under section 303,
a bankruptcy judge who is so inclined may use his discretion
under section 305 to dismiss the petition provided the debtor will
file for relief under Chapter 13.176
1" 1978 Act § 505(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 505(c)).
17 See note 24 supra.
368 124 CONG . REC. H11,115 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
I" 1978 Act § 301 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 301).
170 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1976).
171 Id. §§ 1021. 1022; In re Hale, 274 F. Supp. 813, 816 (W.D. Va. 1967).
372 1978 Act § 303(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 303(a)).
'71 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 120; 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at
499 (statement of Irving Sulmeyer); 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 360 (statement
of Prof. Vern Countryman).
' ' 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1976).
37 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 120; 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at
1420 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman).
37 This observation is drawn from 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 861-62
(statement of Prof. Samual Donnelly).
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The 1978 Act omits the provision in current law for a bond
to indemnify the estate against diminution thereof pending a stay
of adjudication and administration of a debtor who originally
filed in bankruptcy."' The provision is of limited usefulness be-
cause it is restricted to cases filed after bankruptcy and the bond
is always discretionary with the court.'
B. Filing of Claims
The filing of claims by creditors will be controlled by the
statute. Any creditor may file a claim'79 and if he fails to do so,
the debtor, a codebtor, or the trustee may file his claim.' 0 Unlike
current law, there is no requirement in the statute that each
creditor filing a claim prove that the debt is free from usury.""
However, such a requirement remains in the current rules and the
rule may be valid under the 1978 Act. 8 1 Post-petition claims aris-
ing from (1) the rejection of executory contracts and leases, (2)
the recovery of exempt property by the debtor under section
552(i), (3) transfers avoided by the trustee under section 550, (4)
the recovery by the trustee for improper setoffs, and (5) a tax
entitled to a section 507(a)(1) priority may be filed subject to the
same rules as pre-petition claims. 8 3 In addition, a claim may be
filed by any entity that holds a claim against the debtor for taxes
that become payable during the case or for a post-petition con-
sumer debt for services or property essential to the debtor's per-
formance under the plan.'
84
C. Allowance of Claims
The allowance of claims will be controlled by section 502
generally. However, post-petition consumer debts for property or
services which are necessary to the debtor's performance under
7 11 U.S.C. § 1026 (1976).
'~' 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 24.14 (14th ed. 1940).
i' 1978 Act § 501 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 501). Cf BANKR. R. 13-301, 13-302
(mechanics of filing will still be controlled by the rules).
110 1978 Act §§ 501(b)-(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(b)-(c)). Cf BANKR. R.
13-303, 13-304 (filing of claims by debtor, trustee, and codebtor).
I 11 U.S.C. § 1056(b) (1976). For an exhaustive review of the history of this provi-
sion, see In re Perry. 272 F. Supp. 73 (D. Me. 1967).
"' BANKR. R. 13-301(a).
1978 Act §§ 502(g)-(i) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(g)-(i)). Cf. BANKER. R.
13-305 (post-petition claims).
1" 1978 Act § 1305(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)). Cf. BANKR. R. 13-305
(post-petition claims). Apparently this provision precludes the debtor, codebtor, or trustee
from filing such a claim under BANKR. R. 13-303, 13-304 if the creditor fails to do so.
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the plan will be disallowed if the creditor knew or should have
known that prior approval of the obligation from the trustee was
practicable and was not obtained.1 5 While the apparent purpose
of such an inclusion was to prevent unauthorized credit exten-
sions to overburdened debtors,' it has been criticized as opening
the door for subsequent suit in state court on the debt, interest,
and late charges in the situation where the trustee should have
approved the debt but does not.'87
D. Setoffs
Despite strong criticism that setoffs are inconsistent with the
Chapter 13 policy of freeing the debtor's assets in return for a
commitment of payment out of future earnings,88 pre-petition
setoffs are permitted under the 1978 Act under certain condi-
tions.' 6 A similar result has been reached under the current stat-
ute.190
E. The Plan
The plan is to be filed by the debtor 9' and may provide for
payments to continue for up to three years, or, with court ap-
proval, for not longer than five years.9 2 This limitation is de-
signed to protect debtors from unduly onerous plans and the tax-
paying public from excessive use of the bankruptcy courts as
collection vehicles for protracted cases. 9 3 It may be that the limi-
" 1978 Act § 1305(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1305(c)). The disallowed claims
are not discharged by completion of the plan. See note 246 and accompanying text infra.
M 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1317 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr).
"7 Id. at 1425 (statement of Claude Rice).
' Id. at 1411 (statement of Prof. Vern Countryman).
a 1978 Act § 553 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 553). Cf. 1978 Act § 362(a)(7) (to be
codified in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7)) (enjoins post-petition setoffs).
In re Foutz. 271 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Va. 1967). Accord 47 Comp. Gen. 522 (1968).
"' 1978 Act § 1321 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1321). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1033(2) (1976);
BANKR. R. 13-201 (similar provision under current law).
" 1978 Act § 1322(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)). While there is no explicit
limitation on the duration of a plan under current law, most plans are limited to three
years as a result of 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976). This allows the debtor to seek a hardship
discharge if he has performed under the plan for three years. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra
note 6, at 160.
" 3 Girth. supra note 10, at 67. These limits are the result of a compromise. Some felt
three years was too long to allow a debtor to subject himself and his family to the restraints
of Chapter 13 and to forecast the financial fate of debtors. 1975 Houe Hearings, supra
note 6, at 1323 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr). Others wanted to
permit plans to extend beyond three years because the terms of credit purchases of big
ticket items often extend for up to five years and beyond. Id. at 1406 (statement of Duncan
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tation on the duration of the plan will have less significance than
is expected. Initial statistical studies indicate that creditors and
debtors allow plans to continue well beyond scheduled comple-
tion dates even after several defaults' 94 and, absent a hardship
discharge or conversion to another Chapter, the defaulting debtor
will not be able to earn a discharge until all payments called for
in the plan have been made.
19 5
The plan subjects so much of the debtor's future income as
is necessary to payment of creditors under the plan.'"1 In addition,
the debtor will be permitted to provide for the payment of all or
any part of a claim from property of the estate or property of the
debtor.'97 Actual payment to creditors is to be made by the trustee
unless otherwise provided in the plan or order confirming the
plan. 
9 8
The rights of any creditor other than a creditor secured by a
lien on the debtor's principal residence may be modified.9 9 How-
ever, the plan must provide for full payment for all claims enti-
tled to a priority under section 507 unless the holder of the claim
agrees to different treatment. It may classify claims but must
provide for uniform treatment for each claim within a particular
class.20' Unsecured creditors may be classified on the basis of an
Kester, President, National Association of Chapter Xm Trustees). The Department of
Justice suggested that no plan be allowed which called for performance in less than three
years unless all creditors were to be paid in full. Id. at 2126.
" Girth, supra note 10, at 55-61.
" 1978 Act § 1328(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)).
1k Id. § 1322(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1046(4)
(1976) (similar provision in current law).
"1 1978 Act § 1322(b)(8) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(8)). The Commission
felt that such a provision would reduce creditor objections to composition plans. They also
felt that a plan that intended to pay a composition plan solely from future income might
not meet the statutory standards of good faith and best interests of creditors. H.R. Doc.
No. 137, supra note 6, at 163-64.
"' 1978 Act § 1326(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1326(b)).
" Id. § 1322(b)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)). Under current law, a
plan may not deal with claims secured by "estates in real property or chattels real." 11
U.S.C. § 1006(1) (1976); Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir.
1966);In re Willett. 265 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Cal. 1967).
"1 1978 Act § 1322(a)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2)). There is no similar
requirement that the plan include such a provision. However, 11 U.S.C. § 1059(6) (1976)
and BANKR. R. 13-309(a) require debts entitled to a priority under section 64 of the current
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104, to be paid first and in full before any distribution to
creditors.
"1 1978 Act § 1322(a)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3)). No definition for
classification of claims exists in Chapter 13 but the reference to section 1122 in section
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arbitrary dollar' ceiling but the debtor may not discriminate un-
fairly against any such class. 2 In addition, the plan may provide
for the curing or waiving of any defaultm and for the payment of
any unsecured claim to be made concurrently with the payment
of any other secured or unsecured claims.204 With regard to any
claim on which the last payment is due after completion of the
plan, it may provide for the curing of any defaults within a rea-
sonable time and for maintenance of payments while the case is
pending.205 All or any part of a post-petition claim for taxes or for
a consumer debt allowed under section 1305 can be dealt with in
the plan.205 However, others will continue to deal with the debtor
with assurance of being paid, irrespective of whether they have
section 1305 claims provided for in the plan if the claims are
section 507(a)(1) administrative expenses which are entitled to
payment before satisfaction of other creditors under the plan.0 7
The plan may also provide for the assumption or rejection of
executory contracts and leases2 1 and the vesting of property of the
estate upon confirmation of the plan or at a later time in the
debtor or any other entity.209 Finally, it may include any other
appropriate provision not inconsistent with the new act.
210
1322(b)(1) suggests that a class consists of claims "substantially similar to other claims
in such class." Under current law, the debtor can treat each secured creditor severally,
11 U.S.C. § 1046(2) (1976), but general creditors must be treated alike, id. § 1046(1).
m 1978 Act § 1322(b)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1)). The ability to treat
unsecured creditors by classes was urged because it allows for added flexibility in dealing
with diverse claims. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1425-26 (statement of Claude
L. Rice); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 855 (statement of Prof. Samuel J.M.
Donnelly).
1978 Act § 1322(b)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3)).
- Id. § 1322(b)(4) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(4)). Apparently, this was
the result of the feeling of the Commission that this would cure the inequity created when
a debtor pays his secured creditors to free his collateral and then defaults on the plan
before payment is made to the unsecured creditors. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6,
at 603 (statement of Senator Burdick).
20 1978 Act § 1322(b)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5)). See also note 153
and accompanying text supra. Such a claim would not be discharged by the Chapter 13
discharge. See note 244 and accompanying text infra.
2" 1978 Act § 1322(b)(6) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(6)).
Id. § 1326(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)). See note 235 and accompany-
ing text infra.
1978 Act § 1322(b)(7) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(7)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1046(6) (1976) (similar provision in current law).
" 1978 Act § 1322(b)(9) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(9)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
110(i) (1976) (similar provision in current law).
1978 Act § 1322(b)(10) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(10)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §




F. Modifications of the Plan
Pre-confirmation modifications of the plan will be somewhat
similar to the procedure under the present statute.21I The debtor
may modify the plan at any time before confirmation subject to
the provisions required to be contained in the plan by section
1322. Since only secured creditors will accept or reject the plan
under the 1978 Act,212 the debtor will not solicit acceptances from
unsecured creditors. A secured creditor is deemed to accept or
reject the modified plan the same as he accepted or rejected the
original plan unless the modified plan alters his rights and he
affirmatively rejects the plan.
213
Post-confirmation modifications will be crucial in Chapter 13
due to layoffs, strikes, illness, accidents, and other unforeseen
circumstances. On any plan providing for an extension, the cur-
rent bankruptcy act authorizes the court to increase or reduce the
amount of any installment payment under the plan, extend or
shorten the time for such payments, alter the amount of the dis-
tribution to any creditor provided for in the plan to take account
of any satisfaction to such creditor outside the plan, or otherwise
alter the payment or confirmation order. Such action may only
be taken after a hearing and notice to such parties as the court
may designate."' Nevertheless, no reduction in the total amount
to be paid to creditors under the plan is sanctioned. The court is
limited to increasing or reducing the amount or frequency of the
installment payments.215 The 1978 Act eliminates the restriction
to extension plans and the requirement for notice and a hearing
before a plan can be modified. The plan as modified becomes the
plan unless a creditor objects and the plan is disapproved after
notice and a hearing.211 While it is not clear who is to modify the
plan, this latter change indicates the power lies exclusively with
the debtor rather than the court as under current law. This would
conform with the suggestion of a noted commentator during the
legislative hearings on an earlier version of the act.
2 1
211 11 U.S.C. §§ 1053-1055 (1976); BANKR. R. 13-212.
21 1978 Act § 1325(a)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)).
Id. § 1323(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1323(c)).
21 11 U.S.C. § 1046(5) (1976); BANKR. R. 13-214(a).
215 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 28.06 (14th ed. 1940).
, 1978 Act § 1329(b)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)).




While the 1978 Act generally carries forward the language of
rule 13-214(a), two key changes have been made. The new act
permits the plan to be modified to "increase or reduce the amount
of [any of the installment] payments on claims of a particular
class provided for by the plan." ''1 The bracketed portion is lan-
guage from the rule which has been deleted and the italicized
section is new language added by the 1978 Act. Clearly, the plan
can be modified with respect to one class without affecting pay-
ments to others under the new act. It should also be understood
that this clause permits the modification of the total amount to
be distributed to any class under the plan. 219 In addition, lan-
guage in the rule allowing modification to account for payments
to a creditor outside the plan has been excised in the 1978 Act
because amendment of the plan to allow satisfaction of a creditor
outside the plan was thought to be an invitation for abuse. 22
The modified plan must comply with subsections 1322(a)
and (b), 2 which control the contents of the plan, and cannot
extend beyond three years after the initial payment on the origi-
nal plan was due unless the court, for cause, extends the limit for
up to five years.tm Secured creditors are given the same voting
protections they enjoy with respect to preconfirmation modifica-
tions and all creditors are protected by the confirmation require-
ments in section 1325(a) with which the modified plan must con-
form.23
G. Confirmation
The confirmation of plans has undergone significant
changes. The plan will be confirmed if (1) it complies with the
applicable provisions of Chapter 13 and other apposite sections
of the 1978 Act;24 (2) the filing fee has been paid;22 (3) it has been
"18 1978 Act § 1329(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)).
219 Language referring to installment payments appeared in H.R. 31 and S. 236, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 6-205 (1975), and was criticized for not permitting a remodeling of the
whole plan. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1427-28 (statement of Claude L. Rice).
Moreover, since secured creditors are allowed to vote on the modification, 1978 Act §
1329(b)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1)), and the modification is subject to
the other creditor protections contained in the confirmation provision, id., the power to
alter the total amount of payments under the plan should be inferred.
22 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1427 (statement of Claude L. Rice).
n' 1978 Act § 1329(b)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1)).
2n Id. § 1329(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(c)).
= Id. § 1329(b)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1)).
22, Id. § 1325(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1056(a)(1) (1976) (similar provision in current law).
22 1978 Act § 1325(a)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2)). The 1978 Act adds
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proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law; m
(4) each unsecured claim is scheduled to receive sums at least as
large as it would receive upon immediate liquidation;'" and (5)
the debtor will be able to make all payments under and comply
with the plan.22 In addition, each creditor with an allowed, se-
cured claim "provided for"'2 by the plan must (1) accept the
plan; (2) have his collateral surrendered to him; or (3) retain his
lien under the plan, and the value of the property to be distrib-
uted to him under the plan must not be less than the allowed
amount of his claim.2" Conspicuously absent is the requirement
in current law that confirmation is conditioned on the debtor
being innocent of any of the acts which would be a bar to dis-
charge in bankruptcy. 2 '
As under current law, an order of confirmation may be set
aside within 180 days after its entry, after notice and a hearing,
upon application of a party in interest. The present statute re-
a new section to title 28 which requires a $60 filing fee for a Chapter 13 case. Id. § 246
(to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1930). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1024(2) (1976) (current fee is $15).
r" 1978 Act § 1325(a)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1056(a)(4) (1976) (similar provision in current law).
22 1978 Act § 1325(a)(4) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1056(a)(2) (1976) (plan must be in best interests of creditors). Current law is clear that
"best interests of creditors" is served by a plan which proposes to pay creditors substan-
tially what they would receive in liquidation even if a more lucrative plan is feasible. 1975
House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1319, 1321 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad
K. Cyr); cf. Adler v. Jones, 109 F. 967 (6th Cir. 1901) (former section 12 proceeding).
' 1978 Act § 1325(a)(6) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. §
1056(a)(2) (1976) (plan must be feasible); In re Thompson, 349 F. Supp. 990 (M.D. Ga.
(1972) (test for determining whether plan is "feasible" is whether the plan can be accom-
plished as a practical matter with one factor being the debtor's earning power).
rn This term is not defined in the 1978 Act. Current law does not permit a plan to
"deal with" a secured creditor without his consent. 11 U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1976). Likewise,
this term is undefined by the bankruptcy act now in force. Case law has split on whether
a secured creditor is "dealt with" by a plan. See notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
Current law also provides that the plan must be accepted by a majority in number and
amount of all unsecured creditors "affected by" the plan. This term is defined at 11 U.S.C.
§ 1007 (1976). Under Chapter 11 of the 1978 Act, absent certain creditor protections, each
class "impaired by" the plan must accept it. 1978 Act § 1129(a)(8) (to be codified in 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)). This latter phrase is defined at id. § 1124 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1124)).
"3* 1978 Act § 1325(a)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)).
23 11 U.S.C. § 1056(a)(3) (1976). The Commission felt that if the plan is in the best
interests of creditors and has been proposed in good faith, the fact that the debtor may
not be eligible for a discharge in bankruptcy should not prevent confirmation of a plan
proposing payment from future earnings. H.R. REP. No. 137, supra note 6, at 163. See also
1975 House Hearings. supra note 6, at 1318 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad
K. Cyr); 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 605 (statement of Claude L. Rice).
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quires that fraud must be shown to have occurred in the procure-
ment of the plan.2 ' The 1978 Act alters this language and permits
revocation upon a showing of fraud in the procurement of the
order of confirmation.n Once the order of confirmation has been
set aside, the court will dismiss the case, or convert it to liquida-
tion, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate,
unless, within a time specified by the court, the debtor proposes
a modified plan which is confirmed by the court.2'
H. Payment
Before or at the time of each payment to creditors, all first
priority claims must be brought currentm and any fees due to a
standing trustee must be paid.' In addition, the court has the
power to order any person or entity which pays income to the
debtor to make the payments directly to the trustee.27 The more
difficult question which remains unresolved is whether the




The debtor is given plenary power to convert the case to
n2 11 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976). But see BANKR. R. 13-214(b), 13-215(a) (confirmation
procured by fraud).
2n 1978 Act § 1330(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1330(a)).
-3 Id. §§ 1330(b), 1307 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1330(b), 1307).
u Id. § 1326(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1). Cf 11 U.S.C. § 1059(b)
(1976); BANKR. R. 13-309(a) (current law has a much more extensive list, including all
priority claims). However, under Chapter XIII there has been a dispute over whether
priority claims under section 64(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(5) (1976), are entitled to prior
payment. Compare In re Belkin, 358 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1966) with In re Bailey, 188 F.
Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
1978 Act § 1326(a)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)).
'3 Id. § 1325(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1058(2) (1976);
BANKR. R. 13-213(b) (similar provision in current law). Under current law, it has been held
that such an order may not run against the United States as an employer. United States
v. Krakover, 377 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967); accord 47
Comp. Gen. 522 (1968).
Compare In re Jackson, 424 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911
(1970) with In re Stephenson, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH)
63,566 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); In re Crutcher, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) 63,415 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); and In re Sparks, 306 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
Since these cases were decided prior to the effective date of Title Inl of the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1976), it has not been decided
what effect the statute will have on this question. See Comment, [19701 ILL. L.F. 571.
The prohibition on discharge in section 304(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976), is
based on a garnishment for any "one indebtedness." See also Brennan v. Kroger Co., 513
F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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liquidation or to dismiss the case if it has not been converted to
another chapter. His rights in this respect cannot be waived.m On
request of a party in interest and for cause shown, after notice and
a hearing, the court may dismiss the case or convert it to liquida-
tion, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the es-
tate.u ° The court also has the power to convert the case to Chap-
ter 13 on request of a party in interest, after notice and a hearing,
at any time before confirmation. 
24
J. Discharge
Unless .the court approves a written waiver of discharge
4 2
after the filing of the petition, the debtor is entitled to a discharge
from all debts which are disallowed or provided for by the plan
after completion of payments under the plan. 23 The only debts
which are excepted are (1) claims which were not to be exhausted
within the duration of the plan;24 (2) alimony, maintenance, or
child support payments;2' 5 and (3) claims for post-petition con-
sumer goods or services necessary for performance under the plan
which are disallowed because the creditor failed to get prior ap-
proval of the trustee for the obligation.2 6 Chapter XIII currently
provides that the discharge extends to all claims provided for by
the plan but excludes debts which are not dischargeable under
section 17 where the holder of the claim has not accepted the
plan. 247
1" 1978 Act §§ 1307(a), (b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(a), (b)). Cf. BANKR.
R. 13-215(a) (dismissal and conversion under current law).
1,* 1978 Act § 1307(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)). The statute provides a
nonexhaustive list of factors constituting "cause." These are: (1) unreasonable delay by
the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; (2) nonpayment of the filing fee; (3) failure to
timely file a plan; (4) denial of a plan and denial of additional time for filing another plan
or modification; (5) material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan; (6)
revocation of confirmation and denial of confirmation of a modified plan; and (7) termina-
tion of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan.
One court has held that claims which are listed in a previous plan, dismissed for
nonpayment, are barred by res judicata from being listed in a subsequent plan. In re
Dunn, 251 F. Supp. 637 (M.D. Ga. 1966).
Involuntary dismissal may be more difficult for the creditor to obtain than would
appear from a reading of the statute. In re Beasley, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR.
L. REP. (CCH) 64,091 (M.D. Ga. 1971).
241 1978 Act § 1307(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1307(d)).
2I See BANKR. R. 13-405, 13-406.
2" 1978 Act § 1328(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1060
(1976); BANKR. R. 13-404(a) (similar provision in current law).
4 1978 Act § 1328(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1)).
2, Id. § 1328(a)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2)).
2" Id. § 1328(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(d)).
2,1 11 U.S.C. § 1060 (1976).
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A major change in the discharge provisions is the elimination
of the three-year threshold requirement for a hardship dis-
charge." 8 Section 661 was added to the Chandler Act to guard
against the use of Chapter XIII as an instrument of "wage slav-
ery. ' 2 1 However, legislators felt that this three-year condition
placed an unnatural incentive for debtors to propose three-year
plans regardless of their circumstances and to disregard wage
earner relief when performance could not be accomplished within
this time frame.2 50 Moreover, there have been scores of cases
where the debtor has fallen victim to unavoidable circumstances,
such as illness or accident, befbre the lapse of three years. Under
current law, the court has no alternative but to dismiss the case
or to allow the debtor to convert to bankruptcy, the very stigma
the wage earner had tried to avoid.2 1' Under current law, it has
been urged that a suspension or reduction in payments pursuant
to section 646(5) should not entail a similar protraction of the
three-year requirement as a prerequisite to a hardship dis-
charge. " 1 The elimination of the time limitation in the 1978 Act
reinforces the wisdom of that position.
Three requirements will have to be met before a hardship
discharge will be possible under the new law. First, the debtor
cannot be justly held accountable for his failure to complete pay-
ments. Second, each unsecured claim must have received a mini-
mum of liquidation value as of the effective date of the plan.
Finally, modification of the plan must be impracticable.2 5, The
hardship discharge is subject to the same exceptions to discharge
as survive a total performance discharge and the additional ex-
ceptions found in Chapter 5.2
4
One of the major impediments to the use of a composition
24 1978 Act § 1328(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)).
119 Cyr, The 'Compassionate' Discharge, or is it The 'Perilous' Discharge of .f 661, 22
PEaS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 96, 97 & n.8 (1968).
2" H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 125.
21 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1323, 1329 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy
Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
252 In re West, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64,957 (D. Me.
1973).
2" 1978 Act § 1328(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)). Only the first of these
is a condition under current law. 11 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976). But cf. In re Bailey [1973-1975
Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) $ 65,409 (D. Me. 1974) (discharge denied where
modification possible).
21' 1978 Act §§ 1328(c), 523(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(c), 523(a)). See
notes 244-46 supra and accompanying text.
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plan under current law is the bar to a subsequent discharge.2 5
This result stems from dicta in Perry v. Commerce Loan Co.51
which held that a prior bankruptcy within six years would not bar
confirmation of a plan of extension. The language of Perry
strongly suggests it would have barred confirmation of a plan of
composition. 257 The court's reasoning would also bar bankruptcy
relief or confirmation of a plan calling for a composition of debts
within six years after a discharge pursuant to a composition
plan. 58 However, a discharge pursuant to an extension plan
should not bar future relief under the act.25 It has also been held
that where the debtor never received the benefits of discharge
because his prior plan was dismissed, a subsequent plan filed
within six years could be confirmed.2 0 Despite strong language in
the cases that similar rules should apply to the hardship dis-
charge under section 661,21 at least one court has held that the
entry of a hardship discharge does not bar future discharge relief
under the bankruptcy act.
02
The 1978 Act eliminates some of the deterrents to the use of
composition plans. They will no longer bar confirmation of future
Chapter 13 relief calling for composition relief. However, one
hundred percent payments are encouraged by the limitation on
the availability of a subsequent discharge in liquidation. 26 The
limitation is designed to provide a slight brake on the use of
SH.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 6, at 160-61; 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at
1328-29 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K. Cyr).
- 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
257 Id. at 403.
2m Id.
2" Barnes v. Maley, 360 F.2d 922 (7th Cir. 1966); In re Autrey, [1960-1962 Transfer
Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 60,493 (D. Kan. 1962).
In re Dow, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 63,402 (D. Me.
1970).
"I Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 404 (1966); In re Schlageter, 319 F.2d
821, 822 (3d Cir. 1963).
2,2 In re West, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64,957 (D. Me.
1973). The New Hampshire court was almost certainly wrong when it opined that a
bankruptcy discharge entered within six years does not prevent confirmation of any Chap-
ter XIII plan. In re Shamma, 369 A.2d 191 (N.H. 1977).
2' 1978 Act § 727(a)(9) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)). This section provides
that a debtor will not be denied a discharge in liquidation if he has been granted a
discharge under section 1328 of the 1978 Act (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328) or sections
660 or 661 of the current statute, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1060, 1061 (1976), in a case commenced
within six years of the liquidation petition if (1) full payment was made on all allowed,
unsecured claims, or (2) seventy percent was paid on these claims and this represented
the debtor's best effort.
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Chapter 13 by small businessmen who wish to avoid some of the
restrictions of Chapter 11. The Senate Report felt that the pro-
vision was necessary to prevent Chapter 13 plans from becoming
exclusively composition offers in which payments would total the
value of the debtor's nonexempt assets."' It should be noted that
a discharge in liquidation will no longer bar relief by way of a
composition plan under Chapter 13 for six years since there is no
bar comparable to section 14(c)(5) of the current law operative in
Chapter 13.
The remodeled chapter allows a party in interest to request
a revocation of discharge within one year after its entry. The court
will have the power to grant the request only if the discharge was
obtained through fraud and the moving party did not acquire
knowledge of the fraud until after entry of the discharge order."
Chapter III of the present bankruptcy act contains a broader
revocation provision 27 and while no published cases have applied
it in a wage earner context, it applies to the extent not inconsist-
ent with the provisions of Chapter XIII.268
IV. THE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES OF CHAPTER 13 AND CHAPTER 11
Assuming that an individual can qualify to file in Chapter
13 or Chapter 11,69 it is expected that the advantages of Chapter
13 will prove more alluring. Under the current act, Chapter XI
arrangements have proven too cumbersome 270 and costly2' to be
a viable alternative for the small businessman or the individual.
Chapter 11 will permit considerably more creditor involve-
ment than Chapter 13. The former provides for creditors' and
equity holders' committees"2 which will have the right to consult
the debtor or the trustee in regard to the administration of the
21' S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11, at 13. This reasoning is suspect because a discharge
in Chapter 11 is a complete bar to liquidation relief for six years. 1978 Act § 727(a)(8) (to
be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8)).
m Id.
2" 1978 Act § 1328(e) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(e)).
"' 11 U.S.C. § 33 (1976).
Id. § 1002.
2 The eligibility requirements for Chapter 11 are set forth in 1978 Act §§ 109(b),
109(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), 109(d)). The eligibility requirements for
Chapter 13 are discussed at notes 36-43 and accompanying text, supra.
"' H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 119.
271 1975 House Hearings, supra note 6, at 1327 (statement of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Conrad K. Cyr); Lake, Chapter XIII: An Alternative to Straight Bankruptcy for the Wage
Earner, 46 L.A. B. BULL. 380, 384 (1971).
212 1978 Act § 1102(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)).
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estate.21 They also will have the right to participate in the formu-
lation of the plan,2' request the appointment of a trustee or ex-
aminer," 5 and perform such other services in the interests of cred-
itors and equity holders. 26 Moreover, these committees, as well
as any other party in interest, have the right to raise and appear
and be heard in regard to any issue in the case.27
A debtor who files in Chapter 11 runs the risk that a trustee
will be appointed"I and divest him of the right to operate his
business.271 In addition, a Chapter 11 trustee, or an examiner
appointed by the court in a case where a trustee has not been
appointed, n " will have broad investigative powers to inquire into
the financial affairs and condition of the debtor's business similar
to those granted to the Chapter 13 trustee.
28'
A Chapter 11 debtor must solicit approval from unsecured
creditors and equity holders in addition to secured creditors while
the Chapter 13 debtor need only seek approval from the latter
group. Solicitation of approval of the plan from holders of claims
or interests in Chapter 11 cannot take place prior to the holder
being furnished a disclosure statement containing "adequate in-
formation ' '2 2 about the debtor and his business.23
The debtor may find that confirmation is more difficult to
obtain in Chapter 11. Therein, each class of creditors and equity
holders impaired by the plan must consent to the plan2' or be
afforded certain protections against erosion of position. In addi-
tion, a class of creditors secured by an interest in property of the
estate may be given an election to be treated as fully collateral-
ized to the extent of their allowed claim.8 5 This means such a
class of secured creditors can elect to be treated as fully secured
17 Id. § 1103(c)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1)).
' d. § 1103(c)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(3)).
Id. § 1103(c)(4) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(4)).
271 Id. § 1103(c)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5)).
rn Id. § 1109(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b)).
"I Id. § 1104(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)).
271 Id. § 1108 (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1108).
2 Id. § 1104(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)).
281 Id. §§ 1104(b), 1106(a)(3)-(4), 1106(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(b),
1106(a)(3)-(4). 1106(b)).
2" Id. § 1125(a)(1) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)).
20 Id. § 1125(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b)).
2m Id. § 1129(a)(8) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)).
ml Id. § 1111(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)).
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creditors for purposes of the protection afforded secured creditors
in a Chapter 11 "cash out."
The protection afforded a class of dissenting secured credi-
tors in Chapter 11 corresponds to a provision in Chapter 13 pro-
tecting nonconsenting secured creditors.nl The former requires
that the plan may be confirmed over the opposition of a class of
secured creditors if the plan does not discriminate unfairly and
it is fair and equitable. Section 1129(b)(2) provides guidelines for
the fair and equitable standard which are closely allied to the
protections afforded objecting secured creditors in Chapter 13.57
Since unsecured creditors and equity holders are not permitted
to vote on the plan in Chapter 13, no protections need be incorpo-
rated into the plan for the benefit of objecting classes to insure
confirmation as is required in Chapter 11.2 s8
Chapter 11 offers more opportunities for the debtor to find
himself controlled by third parties. While only the debtor may file
the plan in Chapter 13, under certain conditions any party in
interest may file a plan in Chapter 11.28 Chapter 13 offers greater
opportunities for the debtor to convert the case to liquidation2
and fewer reasons to allow a party in interest to request dismissal
of the case or conversion to liquidation .
29
While Chapter 11 discharges the debtor upon confirmation
of the plan,S2 and, absent a hardship discharge, the Chapter 13
debtor will not earn a discharge until fulfilling his obligations
under the plan, the discharge in Chapter 11 is more limited. None
of the claims excepted from discharge by section 523 are dis-
charged in Chapter 11 whereas they would be upon completion
2" Compare id. §§ 1129(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(A) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§
1129(b)(a), 1129(b)(2)(A)) with id. § 1325(a)(5) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)).
21 The third alternative, providing secured creditors with the indubitable equivalent
of their claims, is clearly satisfied by surrender of the collateral to the creditor or by
extending a lien on similar property. 124 CONG. REC. S17,421 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
" 1978 Act §§ 1129(b)(2)(B)-(C) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(B)-(C)).
It should be noted that the fair and equitable standard of section 1129(b)(2) of the 1978
Act applied only to dissenting classes. Hence, unlike the fair and equitable rule of Chapter
X and section 77 of the present law, senior accepting classes of unsecured creditors and
interest holders are permitted to surrender value to more junior classes as long as no
dissenting intervening class receives less than the full amount of its claims. 124 CONG. REC.
S17,420 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
"1 1978 Act § 1121(c) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)).
"0 Compare id. § 1112(a) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a)) with id. § 1307(a)
(to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a)).
21 Compare id. § 1112(b) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)) with id. § 1307(c)
(to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)).
"I Id. § 1141(d) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)).
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of the Chapter 13 plan.2 3 Moreover, if the Chapter 11 plan essen-
tially calls for a liquidation of the debtor's assets, a discharge will
be denied in Chapter 11 if it would be denied in liquidation under
section 727(a).nl
CONCLUSION
On October 1, 1979, the nation will be confronted with the
first comprehensive revision of bankruptcy law since the Chan-
dler Act of 1938. The modernization of the American law of bank-
ruptcy has come only after persistent effort by the major partici-
pants and compromise by all factions of the economy. The in-
creasing use of Chapter XIII wage earner plans has prompted a
major effort aimed at reform by the draftsmen who sculptured the
new Chapter 13. They have widened the corridors of eligibility
and have contemporized its structural provisions.
This analysis has attempted to explore the changes that will
be taking place and to put them in perspective by examining the
reasons for the modifications. Armed with a better understanding
of the workings of Chapter 13, the attorney will be better able to
serve his client and promote the economic health of the com-
munity.
I d. § 1141(d)(2) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2)).
1d. § 1141(d)(3) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)).
1979

